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Since Mirrlees (1971), the theory of optimal taxation has largely been developed
in the intensive model setup, where labor supply is continuous. The properties
of the optimal tax scheme now have been thoroughly investigated in this frame-
work (see, among others, (Seade (1977), Seade (1982), Werning (2000), Hellwig
(2005)). Comparatively, much less attention has been devoted to the extensive
model, in spite of the fact that it may be empirically important as Heckman
(1993) convincingly argues. The early work of Diamond (1980) stresses non con-
vexity issues in a simple example, but it had no following until Saez (2002). In
this paper, we examine in depth the extensive model of optimal taxation. We
derive qualitative properties of optimal schedules from a full-
edged model of
labor force participation and stress the impact of heterogeneity on the eciency-
redistribution tradeo.
First a word of caution is in order. In the intensive model, attention is fo-
cussed on the marginal tax rates which there determine labor supply. In the
extensive model, workers are concerned with average tax rates. The average tax
rate is equal to 1 minus the ratio (net income at work - subsistence income out of
work)/(labor cost). Here `net income at work' denotes disposable income when
taking a full time job, `subsistence income out of work' is disposable income when
not working, including, say in the USA, food stamps and temporary assistance
for needy families, and `labor cost' is the cost of labor to the employer, a proxy
for productivity in a competitive environment. Subsidizing work, compared with
laissez-faire, is equivalent to have negative average tax rates:1 this means a dis-
posable income larger than the sum of productivity and of the subsistence income
one would collect if unemployed.
Another dierence between the intensive and the extensive models comes from
the available information. In the extensive model, workers have little opportunity
to evade the tax: as soon as after tax income is an increasing function of before tax
income, they work at their full productivity. Their only choice is between working
or not working. Thus the informational asymmetry which prevents the scal
authority from getting to the rst best lies in the determinants of the participation
decision which are private knowledge to the (potential) workers. We set a general
structural model of discrete choice, which allows for dierences in productivity
and multidimensional heterogeneity in the participation factors. We derive a
convenient reduced form from the structural model, which summarizes the various
determinants of participation into a unidimensional work opportunity cost. We
investigate the relationships between the structural and reduced forms. It turns
1Some of the models of the literature have both intensive and extensive components. Then
subsidizing labor may take place at the extensive margin (negative average tax rate), at the
intensive margin (negative marginal tax rate), at no margins, or at both. The literature is not
explicit on the topic.
1out that the distribution of work opportunity costs, conditional on productivity
and on income out of work, inherits properties from the structural model which
are important for the analysis. In a large part of the paper, we work under the
simplifying assumption that the distribution of work opportunity costs in the
economy is independent of productivity.
The second best program is not concave: the proportion of agents at work,
whose opportunity costs are smaller than their gains from working, enters the
feasibility constraint and this typically is not a concave function of its arguments.
A pointwise maximization of the Lagrangian, at each productivity level, yields
the second best optima. It turns out that there is no pooling: on the range of
productivities where the sets of workers and unemployed agents are both non-
negligible, after tax income is a strictly increasing function of productivity. Dene
the social weight of a group of individuals as their average marginal utilities of
income. Then consider the workers of a given productivity level. When their
social weight is larger than the marginal cost of public funds, their labor supply
is subsidized, i.e. they face a negative tax rate, and they are better o than at the
laissez-faire. Conversely when their social weight is smaller than the marginal cost
of public funds, they face a positive tax rate and work less than at the laissez-
faire. This property follows from the rst order condition associated with the
income level and can be explained as follows. Let  be the marginal cost of
public funds, the multiplier of the government budget constraint. Consider a
small change in the tax schedule in favor of workers of productivity !, keeping
unchanged the situation of the other agents. This reform has two eects on the
population of productivity !: it increases the incomes of the workers, and it
brings into the labor force some previously unemployed persons. When the social
weight of the workers is larger than the marginal cost of public funds, the rst,
purely redistributive, eect increases social welfare. The second, distortive, eect
comes from the pivotal agents that enter the labor force. They are essentially
indierent between working and not working, and their impact on social welfare
comes from the dierence between their productivity ! and the cost of putting
them to work. For the rst order condition to be satised, this dierence must
be negative: the nancial incentive to work (income at work minus subsistence
income) has to be larger than productivity.
Redistribution comes from restrictions on the social weights of the participants
in the economy. A property of the government objective in the intensive model is
that social weights decrease with income: the social planner wants to redistribute
towards poor people. Here, in the extensive model with multidimensional het-
erogeneity, utilitarianism and the concavity in income of the utility functions are
not enough to warrant this property: the private characteristics that determine
participation may be associated with a redistributive motive positively correlated
with income. However, we give simple natural supplementary conditions under
which the social weights of the workers decrease with income. Then, income be-
2ing increasing with productivity, social weights are larger for the lower skilled
employees at the optimum. If negative tax rates are present at the optimum,
they concern an interval of productivities at the bottom of the distribution. The
optimum allocation can take one of the two following shapes: either the average
tax rate is always positive, so that labor supply is everywhere downwards dis-
torted; or the persons whose skills are at the low end of the distribution face a
negative tax rate and are better o than at the laissez-faire. The former case is
qualitatively similar to the optimal tax of the intensive Mirrlees model, while the
latter is very dierent. We now discuss when it occurs.
To this end, a further rst order condition of the optimal tax program is
of interest. It is associated with an equal marginal change of the incomes of
everyone in the economy. It says that the marginal cost of public funds is a
weighted average, with positive weights summing up to 1, of the social weights
of all the agents in the economy. Consider now the benchmark model where the
agents get a utility U(s) when unemployed and U(R ) when they work, with s
denoting subsistence income, R income at work and  the work opportunity cost
which varies in the population. Then the marginal employees, who are indierent
between working and not working, have the same utility levels as the unemployed,
and the social weights of these two groups of agents are equal to U0(s). In such
an economy, if there is any redistribution at all, the weights of the most favored
agents are larger than the marginal cost of public funds. Provided weights are
a continuous function of income, we therefore are in the second case described
above: there are negative tax rates and nancial incentives to work are higher
than under laissez-faire at the bottom of the income distribution. This property
obviously is satised in a wider range of situations than the just outlined simple
model, but it does not always hold. It can break down when social weights
are discontinuous: in particular, in the Rawlsian case, where social weights are
zero as soon as income is above the minimum, average tax rates are everywhere
nonnegative. Similarly, if the weights put on the unemployed agents is (strictly)
larger than that of the low income workers, tax rates could also be everywhere
positive.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the labor supply model,
while Section 3 presents the tax instruments and government objective. The rst
order condition satised by the tax schedule are derived in Section 4. Section 5
presents in turn the properties of general second best tax schedules and the re-
strictions that they satisfy under a redistributive government. Section 6 presents
the full set of equations satised by an optimum, and Section 7 discusses the role
of heterogeneity. The shape of taxes at the bottom of the income distribution
and the likelihood of negative taxes or upwards distortion the nancial incentives
to work are discussed in the conclusion. Proofs are gathered in the appendix.
32 Heterogeneity and the description of the pri-
vate economy
We consider an economy with a continuum of participants of measure 1. The
agents' only decision is whether to work or not. The agents dier along several
dimensions. First, they dier by their productivity levels !, the before tax income
that they generate when they work. Second, there is a possibly multidimensional
heterogeneity parameter  that describes other idiosyncratic characteristics, such
as the costs of going to work. Allowing for a lot of heterogeneity (i.e. a multi-
dimensional parameter ) accords with empirical studies where marital status,
family composition, human capital and culture often appear to be determinants
of the labor supply decision.
Let cE be the income of someone who decides to work, cU her income when
unemployed. Utility is described by
(
~ u(cE;;!) if she participates,
~ v(cU;;!) if she does not work,
(1)
and the decision is the one that yields the highest utility. The utility functions
~ u and ~ v are assumed to be twice continuously dierentiable. They are increasing
and concave in (nonnegative) consumption.
The work opportunity cost is the (possibly negative) sum of money which,
given to an agent if she works on top of the subsistence income she has while
unemployed, makes her indierent between working or not. Formally, from the
monotonicity of ~ u, for each agent (;!) and for each level of consumption when
not working cU, there exists a number  = (;!;cU) such that the agent wants
to work (~ u > ~ v) if cE > cU + , does not want to work if cE < cU +  and is
indierent if cE = cU + , i.e.  is solution to the equation2
~ u(cU + ;;!) = ~ v(cU;;!): (2)
The threshold  is the work opportunity cost of the agent. In the terminology of
labor supply, the net wage or the net gain from work is the dierence cE   cU,
and an agent works whenever her net wage exceeds her opportunity cost of work.
The subsistence income or other income unrelated to work is cU. Labor supply is
subject to an income eect when the work opportunity cost (;!;cU) depends
on other income cU. If leisure is a normal good, labor supply decreases with other
income, i.e. (;!;cU) is nondecreasing in cU.
An economy is dened by a pair of utility functions (~ u; ~ v) and a distribution of
characteristics (;!). It is convenient to substitute the work opportunity cost 
2We let  equal to  cU for persons who always want to work, and  equal +1 for persons
that never work. We do not rule out  < 0: some agents may be ready to pay to go to work.
4for the multidimensional parameter . Accordingly, we dene the average utilities
of the agents who have the same productivity ! and work opportunity cost  as

u(cE;;!;cU) = E [~ u(cE;;!) j  = (;!;cU);!;cU];
v(cU;;!) = E [~ v(cU;;!) j  = (;!;cU);!;cU]: (3)
Note that the function u generally depends on the subsistence level cU, except
when there are no income eects ( independent of cU). In general, when the
heterogeneity dimension is at least equal to 2, we conjecture that the structural
model does not restrict the shape of the reduced form utilities (see example in
the rst section of the Appendix). However this is not the case when  is of
dimension 1 (for notation simplicity, we have dropped the ! argument in the
statement of the Lemma):
Lemma 1. When there is one dimension of heterogeneity ( is scalar), the
reduced-form model satises
u(cE;;cU)  v(cU;) () cE  cU + : (4)
and
u2(cE;;cU)=u3(cE;;cU) does not depend on cE: (5)
Conversely, if a reduced-form model (u;v) satises conditions (4) and (5), then
there exists a structural model (~ u; ~ v) with unidimensional heterogeneity satisfying
(3).
While the structural model induces little restrictions on the shape of the utility
functions, it has important consequences on the distribution of work opportunity
costs. For each value of cU, the distribution of the underlying parameters induces
a distribution on (;!). We denote F(:j!;cU) the cumulative distribution of work
opportunity costs of persons of productivity ! when out of work income is equal
to cU: F(cE   cUj!;cU) is the proportion of agents of productivity ! that want
to work when income at work is equal to cE and income out of work is cU. Note
that, from the monotonicity of ~ v, the function F(cE cUj!;cU), seen as a function
of cU, is nonincreasing in cU. Also, when leisure is a normal good, an increase in
cU, keeping constant the incentive to work cE   cU, decreases labor supply. To
summarize, when F is dierentiable with respect to its arguments, we have
d
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5The structural and the reduced forms of the model are linked through two
channels. The shape of the function (;!;cU) is one of them. The implicit
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The heterogeneity of the work opportunity cost , given the person's productivity
! which is observed by the government for the workers, is an important feature
of the model (see Section 7 for a discussion): in an interesting model, the utility
functions must have a (generically) non zero ~ v0
   ~ u0
. The other component
that determines the reduced form is the distribution of  conditional on !. It
turns out that the model is much easier to analyze when the distribution of
work opportunity costs, as well as the reduced form utilities, do not vary with
productivity:
Assumption 1. The functions u(cE;;!;cU) and v(cU;;!) and the distribution
of opportunity costs F(:j!;cu) do not depend on the productivity level !.
The main results of the paper are derived under this assumption. Some addi-
tional properties are presented in the general case in the last two sections.
Most of the results carry over to a situation where the distributions have
mass points, provided that there is genuine heterogeneity in the work opportunity
costs (see section 7). To simplify the presentation, we focus on the case where
distributions are continuous.
Assumption 2. The marginal distribution of productivities ! has support 
 =
[!;!], an interval of the positive line. Its cumulative distribution function G has
a continuous positive derivative g everywhere on the support.
The distribution of , conditional on ! and cU, is continuous with support
[;],  < , and cumulative distribution function F(:j!;cU). Its probability dis-
tribution function f(:j!;cU) is positive and continuous everywhere on its support.
Benchmark case: A simple specication of particular interest is the following.
The parameter  is unidimensional and the utility functions are dened through
a concave twice dierentiable increasing function U, such that
~ u(cE;;!) = U(cE   ); ~ v(cU;;!) = U(cU):
Then direct substitutions yield (;!;cU) =  and
u(cE;;!;cU) = U(cE   ); v(cU;;!) = U(cU):
The work opportunity cost of agent (;!) is simply equal to . It is independent
of the value of the subsistence income cU: there are no income eects. Also the
value attached by the government to the welfare of the unemployed agents only
depend on their income, and does not vary with their characteristics (;!).
63 Government behavior and tax schedules
Under laissez-faire, subsistence income out of work is zero, and anyone with a
work opportunity cost  smaller than her productivity !, which then is equal to
income, works. To redistribute income, the government announces a nondecreas-
ing3 income schedule R(:), which associates to any before tax income y, y > 0, a
nonnegative disposable income R(y) and gives to the non workers a subsistence
income s. To the income schedule, one can associate the tax rate (y) faced by
the worker
(y) =






At laissez-faire, (R(y) = y;s = 0), the tax rate (y) is equal to zero. A person
of productivity ! decides to work when her nancial incentive ! is larger than her
work opportunity cost (;!;0), where the third argument of , the subsistence
income, is zero in the absence of any government safety net. In a second best
allocation, the person works when
R(!)   s > (;!;s):
Now the tax rate faced by a person of productivity ! is positive if and only if
! > R(!)   s, i.e. when the nancial incentive to work is smaller at the second
best allocation than at laissez-faire. Then, if leisure is a normal good, that is 
is nonincreasing in its third argument, labor supply is unambiguously distorted
downwards compared to laissez-faire: any unemployed person at laissez-faire,
with ! < (;!;0), is still unemployed at second best, since R(!)   s < ! <
(;!;0)  (;!;s).
When the tax rate is negative, the nancial incentive to work is larger at
the second best than at laissez-faire, ! < R(!)   s. In this circumstance, every
agent of productivity !, with or without a job, prefers the second best to laissez-
faire (max[~ u(R(!);;!); ~ v(s;;!)]  max[~ u(!;;!); ~ v(0;;!)]). But, contrary
to what one might expect by symmetry with the positive rate case, labor supply
is not necessarily distorted upwards: if income eects are strong enough, so that
utility at home, as well as the work opportunity cost, increase a lot with subsis-
tence income, labor supply may be smaller at the second best allocation, even
though nancial incentives to work are larger than at laissez-faire. Of course, in
3We have assumed that the workers always produce at their productivity level !. A slightly
dierent presentation would have the workers indierent to generate any ex-ante income in the
interval[0;!], and the government announce a possibly sometimes decreasing tax function ~ R(:).
Then a worker would choose to produce y solution to maxy! ~ R(y), as in the extensive model her
work opportunity cost is independent of y. The schedule R(:), dened by R(y) = maxzy ~ R(z),
dominates ~ R: workers facing R have no interest to produce y < !. In the language of mechanism
design theory, when an agent can mimic any agent of lower productivity, incentive compatibility
is equivalent to the monotonicity of the income schedule.
7the absence of income eects, when work opportunity costs are independent of
the level of subsistence income, labor supply distortion is of the opposite sign of
the tax rate, compared with laissez-faire.4
The utility functions are normalized so that the objective of the utilitarian
government is the sum of the utilities of the participants in the economy, which
takes the form
E!; max[~ u(R(!);;!); ~ v(s;;!)] = E!; f~ u 1R(!) s + ~ v 1R(!) s< g
= E!; fu 1R(!) s + v 1R(!) s< g;
where the second line follows from the law of iterated expectations, remarking that
the participation decision only depends on  and !. The government objective











[!   R(!) + s]F(R(!)   sj!;s)dG(!) = s: (8)
Without loss of generality, we can impose the additional constraint: R(!) s  
for all ! 2 
.5
Let  be the multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint (8). The








+[!   R + s]F(R   sj!;s)   s:
The optimization takes place over (R;s;), where R is a nonnegative nondecreas-
ing function and s and  are nonnegative. The function L is not concave in its
4Formally, the labor supply of agents with productivity ! is (weakly) distorted upwards if
and only if
!  (;!;0) =) R(!)  s + (;!;s):
When the function R is increasing, which is typically the case, the previous condition is equiv-
alent to
R((;!;0))  s + (;!;s);
which shows that the tax rate is unambiguously linked with the distortion of labor supply only
when there are no income eects,  independent of its third argument.
5The objective does not depend on the precise value taken by R(!) in the region where the
set of workers is negligible, i.e. whenever R(!) s is smaller than or equal to the minimal work
opportunity cost . That is, if R(w)   s <  is optimal, then R(w)   s =  is optimal as well.
8arguments, since the cdf of the work opportunity cost F is typically not concave.
Any utilitarian optimum however must satisfy rst order necessary conditions,
which turn out to be especially fruitful here. In the next two sections, we concen-
trate on the study of R(:), for given values of s and , before commenting brie
y
on the full program in Section 6.
4 First order conditions for R(!)
The derivative of L with respect to R plays a central role in the analysis
@L
@R
(R;s;!) = [!   R + s]f(R   sj!;s)   F(R   sj!;s)[   pE(R;sj!)]; (9)
where pE(R;sj!) is the average social weight of the working agents of productivity
!:
pE(R;sj!) = E [ ~ u
0









The expression of @L=@R has a direct economic interpretation. The rst term
[! R+s]f(R sj!;s) is the gain in government income obtained from the new
f(R   sj!;s) workers who participate following an increase in R: they produce
!, they are paid R(!) but do not receive the subsistence income s anymore. The
second term F(R   sj!;s)[   pE(R;s)] is the loss on the existing workers: the
marginal cost is  per worker, while the social value of this distribution of income
is equal to the average social weight of the employees of productivity !.
At any point ! where R is strictly increasing (no pooling), it satises the rst
order condition for a pointwise maximum
@L
@R
(R;s;!) = 0: (11)
The average tax rate supported by the workers of productivity ! is (!) =
[!   R(!) + s]=!, so that the rst order condition can be rewritten as









At a point ! where the tax schedule R(!) is strictly increasing and R s is in
the interval (;), i.e. some, but not all, agents of productivity ! want to work,
we have
 either pE(R(!);sj!) < , the nancial incentive to work R(!) s is smaller
than before tax income !: it is distorted downwards compared to laissez-
faire;
9 or pE(R(!);sj!) = , the nancial incentive to work R(!) s equals before
tax income !: nancial incentives to work are the same as in laissez-faire
and the workers are better o than at the laissez-faire;
 or pE(R(!);sj!) > , the nancial incentive to work R(!)   s is larger
than before tax income !: it is distorted upwards compared to laissez-faire
and all the persons of productivity ! workers are better o.
Social weights larger than , corresponding to a group of employees whose
average social weight is larger than the marginal cost of public funds, receive a
nancial incentive to work R(!)   s larger than their productivity !, distorted
upwards compared with laissez-faire.6
Remark: When opportunity costs vary with productivities (Assumption 1 is not
satised), the optimum may involve pooling, with regions where R stays constant
because of the monotonicity condition. In a pooling interval [!1;!2], whenever










(R;s;!)dG(!)  0 (14)
for all !1  !  !2. Considering a neighborhood of the extremities of the pooling
interval, the last condition implies
@L
@R
(R;s;!1)  0 and
@L
@R
(R;s;!2)  0: (15)








At a local maximum, @2L=@R2 is negative, so that the monotony of R supposes
@2L=@R@!  0. Conversely, pooling only prevails if there is a region where
@2L=@R@! is negative (see equations 15).
6In the intensive model also, the sign of the marginal tax rate follows from the comparison
of the cost of public funds with the average value of social weights in a certain group of workers.
But the relevant groups diers in the intensive and extensive models. In the former case, what
matters is the population of workers whose productivity is greater than or equal to a given level;
in the latter, only workers with a given productivity are considered. This dierence follows from
the informational structures: the workers' productivities are observed in the extensive model,

















Figure 1: Financial incentives to work
5 The shape of optimal tax schemes
5.1 Unrestricted second best tax schedules
Under assumptions 1 and 2, one can describe more precisely the qualitative prop-
erties of the optimal tax schedule. The geometrical construction of a schedule
is shown on Figure 1. For R   s in the support of the distribution of work
opportunity cost, let:









The rst order condition @L=@R = 0 is equivalent to the equality ! = M(R;s).
With R   s on the vertical axis, we draw the function M on the x-axis, which
is also the !-axis. By construction, for ! smaller than the minimum of M, on
the left of the graph of M, the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to R is
negative, while on the right of the graph it is positive. To look for the pointwise
maximum of the Lagrangian, draw the vertical line through !. When it does not
intersect the graph of M (i.e. ! is outside the range of M), then the optimum
is to have everybody unemployed (R   s  ) when the line is on the left of the
graph, to have everyone employed (R   s  ) when it is on the right of the
graph. Consider now an intersection point: if the slope of M is negative at the
point, this is a local minimum (@L=@R is negative for smaller R's, positive for
larger R's); the local maxima are the intersection points where the slope of M is
11positive. The value of R(!) is the one that yields the higher L, comparing all the
local maxima and the two corners (full employment, or no employment). This
procedure is justied by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider an economy that satises Assumptions 1 and 2.
Then, given the subsistence income s and the marginal cost of public funds
, pointwise maximization of the Lagrangian for each ! yields the optimal tax
scheme. There is no pooling: for any ! such that  < R(!)   s < , !0 > !
implies R(!0) > R(!).
Furthermore, the optimal tax scheme is continuous whenever M is non-decreasing.
If the support of productivities is included in the range of M, the tax scheme is
discontinuous whenever M is decreasing on part of its domain.
The no-pooling property holds in the interval of productivities for which there
are non negligible sets of both employees and unemployed, say [!`;!h]. Then
R is increasing and no employee has interest in faking a smaller productivity
than her own: she then would receive a smaller after tax income. People with
lower productivities than !` are unemployed and receive the subsistence income
s: they are treated as all the unemployed whose productivities are not observed
by the government. Persons with a higher productivity than !h are all working.
Typically, the optimal function R is constant for ! larger than !h, and the high
skilled workers under consideration are indierent between working at their full
productivities ! or at any productivity in the interval [!h;!]. We suppose that
they do not shirk.
It may be useful to spell out what happens at a discontinuity point of the
tax schedule, for instance when one jumps from R  < ! + s to R+ > ! + s at
some productivity !. At R , there is a (relatively) small number of employees,
F(R    sjs) and their average social weights pE(R ;s) is smaller than , since
we supposed that the point lies below the 45 degree line on the graph. At R+,
there are many more employees: all the persons with a work opportunity cost
in the interval [R    s , R+   s] who are unemployed when their productivities
are slightly smaller than ! take a job when their productivity is larger than !.
Since the M curve then is above the 45 degree line, the average social weight
of the employees pE(R+;s) is larger then . For a discontinuity to occur, when
the distributions are smooth (Assumption 2), the average social weight of the
persons of work opportunity costs in [R   s , R+  s] has to be larger than that
of persons with work opportunity costs lower than (R    s).
The previous remark indicates that, as in Stiglitz (1982), the social weights
pE play a crucial role in shaping the income tax schedule. We therefore now look
into the relationships of social weights with the government objective.
125.2 Redistribution
5.2.1 The social weights of the employees
Typically in the intensive model the more productive agents are richer and better
o at the optimum so that with identical preferences social weights decrease
with income. This behavior of the social weights, pE decreases with R, is less
straightforward in the extensive model.7




















1(R;R   s;!;s)f(R   sj!;s):
The rst two terms are negative, following the intuition, but the last term is
positive: an increase in R brings newcomers into employment, whose weights may
be high. Nevertheless one can derive the desired property under two assumptions.
The rst one states that the new entrants in the labor force do not have too high
a marginal utility of income:
Assumption 3. The marginal utility of income of the new entrants into the labor
force is nonincreasing in R for all s and !: u0
1(R;R s;!;s) is nonincreasing in
R.
This assumption does not seem overly restrictive. For instance, in the bench-
mark case described at the end of Section 2, the marginal social utility of new-
comers equals U0(s) and does not depend on R. More generally, the assumption
is satised whenever the marginal utility of income u0
1(R;;!;s) is decreasing in
the opportunity cost of working . The second assumption, the log concavity of
the cumulative distribution of work opportunity costs, is a stronger requirement.
Assumption 4. The distribution of work opportunity costs is log-concave.
We show in the Appendix:
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the average social weight of the
employed of productivity !, pE(R;sj!), is a nonincreasing function of R.
7We provide here structural foundations to Saez (2002)'s statement, page 1049:
If the government values redistribution, then the lower the earnings level of the in-
dividual, the higher the social marginal value of an extra dollar for that individual.
As a result, the weights gi are decreasing in i.
135.2.2 Utilitarian tax schedules
We proceed to describing the shapes of the optimal tax schedules under the
two assumptions 3 and 4, which ensure that the social weights of the employees
decrease with their incomes.8
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1 to 4, if dierent from laissez-faire, the op-
timal income tax schedule satises one of the two following properties in addition
to those of Proposition 1:
1. either the incentive to work is always smaller than productivity, and labor
supply is everywhere distorted downwards, for ! >  + s;
2. or there is a value Rm >  + s of income and an associated productivity
!m = Rm + s such that labor supply is distorted downwards for ! > !m,
while the nancial incentive to work is undistorted or distorted upwards for
!m > ! >  + s.
In both cases, in the region where labor supply is distorted downwards, after tax
income is a continuous function of before tax income, with a slope smaller than 1.
Figure 2, where !  , illustrates the foregoing proposition. Case 1 corre-
sponds to the dotted curve. The graph of M lies below the 45 degree line; all
the workers are taxed; their nancial incentive to work is distorted downwards
compared to laissez-faire, where they would be better o than in the second best.
This situation is typical of a highly redistributive government and holds in partic-
ular under the Rawlsian objective, where pE is zero (see e.g. Chon e and Laroque
(2005)). Case 2 is associated with the bold solid curve, which here is drawn in a
situation where the M curve is monotonic so that incentives to work R(!) s are
a continuous increasing function of productivity.9 There is a low skilled region,
  !  Rm   s, where labor supply is distorted upwards.
Proposition 3 rules out discontinuities of the tax schedule in the region where
labor supply is distorted downwards, but it does not preclude them below Rm
for low incomes, when nancial incentives to work are distorted upwards. The
following example, which satises all the Assumptions of the paper, illustrates
this fact with a uniform distribution of opportunity costs:
8Other properties of the optimal tax schedules, in relationship with the Rawlsian criterion
may be worth recalling. Theorem 6 of Chon e and Laroque (2005) applies here: all the utilitarian
optimal incentive schemes are located above the Rawlsian curve. Theorem 3 of Laroque (2005)
also applies: any incentive scheme above the Laer curve which does not overtax and such
that R(!)   s  ! corresponds to a second best optimal allocation. Note that in a benchmark
model, from the above results, none of these allocations satisfy a utilitarian criterion. All the
utilitarian optimal allocations are such that R(!)   s > ! for some !'s, a property discussed
in Remark 2.3 of Laroque (2005).
9It is similar to Figure IIa in Saez (2002), who discusses from a more applied perspective
the occurrence of negative marginal tax rates.
14-
6





































Figure 2: Two `well behaved' optimal tax schemes
Example 1. Consider a benchmark economy satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2.
Suppose that the opportunity cost  is uniformly distributed on [;] and that
s +  < Rm < s + .
Then R(!) is increasing and concave whenever some agents of productivity !
work, i.e. on the set f!jR(!)   s > g. Two cases arise depending on the social
weight of the unemployed,10 pU:
1. If pU  2, none of the agents of productivity smaller than  work at the
optimum, R()   s = , and the slope of the income schedule at  satises:
R0
+() = 1=[2   pU] > 0.
2. If pU > 2, there exists !0, !  !0, such that R(!)   s >  for all !  !0
and R(!)   s   for productivities smaller than !0. When ! < !0, there
is an upward discontinuity in the incentives to work at !0.
The situation where the social weights of the unemployed agents are high
(pU > 2) is shown on Figure 3, the bold line representing the optimal tax
scheme. None of the agents with very low productivities, ! < !0, work. But
for all ! larger than or equal to !0, a fraction of the agents does. In fact the









ω δ Rm − s
R − s







































Figure 3: Strong upward distortion (uniformly distributed opportunity costs)
upward distortion to labor supply here is particularly strong: some agents with
productivity smaller than the minimal cost of going to work participate in the
labor force. Note that after tax income is a concave function of income, implying
a progressive tax system. There is an upward discontinuity in the tax schedule
at !0.
6 The full program
6.1 The marginal cost of public funds
The preceding section has studied the shape of the optimal tax schemes given
the levels of subsistence income s and of the marginal cost of public funds .
We need two equations to determine these two quantities. One is the feasibility
condition (8). The other is a rst order necessary condition, associated with a
small translation of all incomes, i.e. an equal marginal change in both s and R(!)
for all !. It is proved in the Appendix, without restrictions on the dependence
of work opportunity costs on productivities (Assumption 1 is not used), allowing
for pooling. The social weights of the employees, dened in (10), and of the
unemployed
pU(R;sj!) = E [~ v
0
1(s;;!) j  > R   s; !;s ]; (17)
are the ingredients of the Lemma.











where F stands for F(R(!)   sj!;s).
Absent income eects,  is equal to 0 for all !. When leisure is a normal
good,  is a non positive function of !.
In the case where work opportunity costs do not depend on the level of the
subsistence income (no income eects), the lemma indicates that the familiar
equality of the marginal cost of public funds to the average of the agents marginal











In the presence of income eects, the coecients of pE and of pU are weighted. The
weights are nonnegative and sum up to the coecient of : F(1 )+(1 F) =
1 F. When leisure is a normal good,  is negative and the employees are given
a higher importance than in the absence of income eects.
6.2 When are negative tax rates optimal?
When does a redistributive government, in an economy that satises all the as-
sumptions of the paper, implement negative taxes? The theory helps to answer
the question. In general, utility may depend in a complicated way on a person's
characteristics (productivity, work opportunity cost) and on her work status and
income. However, the fact that the marginal employees are indierent between
working and not working, with work opportunity costs smaller than that of the
unemployed, holds in any labor supply model. Suppose that the utilities of the
unemployed are a nondecreasing function of their work opportunity costs, as in
the benchmark model. Then a redistributive government would impute them a
lower social weight than that of the marginal employees. From (18), it follows
that the social weight of the lower income employees is larger than the marginal
cost of public funds if there is any redistribution at all.11 Then, if social weights
vary continuously with income, there is a range of productivities which include
the lower skills, where the social weights of the workers is larger than the marginal
cost of public funds. It follows that there are upward labor supply distortions for
11Otherwise all the social weights on the left hand side of (18) are at most equal to , so that
for the equality to hold, all weights must be equal to , which corresponds to the laissez-faire
equilibrium.
17low productivity workers at the optimum, and more `working poors' than at the
laissez-faire equilibrium.
On the other hand, situations where the social weight attached to the unem-
ployed agents is larger than that attached to the employees abound: for instance
this may be the case in the presence of `involuntary' unemployment, or when a
large opportunity cost to work is associated with a handicap (the marginal so-
cial weight v0(s;;!) is increasing with ). It is then easy to think of economies
where at the optimum the average social weight of the unemployed is larger than
the marginal cost of public funds and the social weight of the lowest paid work-
ers is smaller. In these economies, after tax income is everywhere smaller than
productivity.
Similarly, the analysis has proceeded under the assumption that the social
welfare function is smooth, so that the distribution of the agents' weights has no
mass point. The case of a Rawlsian planner who puts all the weight on the least
favored agent in the economy corresponds here to a situation where pE is equal
to zero everywhere. Then the tax rate is always positive. This is in line with
the results of Chon e and Laroque (2005). On the other hand, other social choice
criteria, such as the one advocated in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006), may put
the weight on the deserving `working poors'. As a consequence, in an intensive
model with multiple dimensions of heterogeneity, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006)
show that optimal taxation implies subsidizing as much as possible the poorest
workers.
It would be of interest to know whether and when the subsidy result still holds
in the mixed situation where both the extensive and intensive margins operate.
Boone and Bovenberg (2004) analyze such a model where the utility is quasi
linear. There is a xed cost of searching for a job work which is constant across
the population, and the random outcome of search creates heterogeneity. They
nd cases where work is subsidized (Section 4.3), but do not characterize them
in terms of economic fundamentals. More work is needed in this area.
7 An example without heterogeneity
Homburg (2002) considers the limit case where everyone has the same work op-
portunity cost, say 0, a situation where Assumption 2 does not hold. In the
benchmark model (see end of Section 2), the objective takes the form
L(R;s;!) =

U(s)   s if R   s < 0;
U(R   0) + [!   R] if R   s > 0;
The Lagrangian is equal to any of the two above quantities when R   s = 0:
the agent is indierent between working or not, and the planner can choose the
preferred outcome. The problem is to maximize the integral of the Lagrangian
subject to the feasibility constraint over R, R nondecreasing.
18Absent pooling, the rst order condition (11) with respect to R(!) for an
unconstrained worker of productivity ! would be:
U
0(R(!)   0) = :
Since the solution R(!) does not depend on productivity, there is full pooling.




[!   R + s]1 1workers dG(!) = s:
An optimum is characterized by two quantities (R;s) linked by the feasibility
constraint. Furthermore it has to specify the set of workers when R   s is equal
to 0. Consequently, the rst order conditions lead to three possibilities:
1. If R  0 < s, nobody works. By feasibility s is equal to zero. The value of
social welfare, U(0), is at a global minimum when the economy is productive
enough.
2. If R   0 > s, everybody works. The constant income R is equal to the
average productivity in the economy
R







! dG(!)   0

;
which is only dened when
R

 ! dG(!)  0.
3. Finally, when there is indierence between working or not, R 0 = s, and
looking at the expression of L(R;s;!), the planner decides to put to work
the agents with productivity ! at least as large as R   s. The feasibility








! dG(!)   0:
This last case is the optimum whenever there is a non negligible set of agents
with ! > 0. Then there is no upward distortion of labor supply. The utilitarian
optimum does not leave any surplus to the workers and everyone is treated equally.
Heterogeneity in the form of some dispersion of work opportunity costs gives more
scope for redistribution, associated with the unknown value of .
8 Conclusion
It appears that in the extensive model, negative average tax rates and upward
distortions of the nancial incentives to work of the less skilled workers are the
19rule rather than the exception. This property occurs in particular in the stan-
dard benchmark model, provided social weights vary continuously with the utility
levels, when the unemployed workers have chosen not to work. This is in sharp
contrast with the results that follow from the intensive model a la Mirrlees.
The results obtained here may hopefully be useful in the literature that relates
empirical (extensive) labor supply models, taxation and government preferences,
and looks for government preferences that may rationalize the observed tax sys-
tem.
A natural extension of the framework would be to allow for both an extensive
and intensive margins in the labor supply. This should be the subject of further
work.
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21A Appendix
A.1 Relationship between the structural and the reduced
forms
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider the structural model (1) and assume that  is
scalar and that, for any given cU, the map  ! (;cU) is one-to-one. We note
 1(:;s) the inverse function:  !  1(;cU). We have
u(cE;;cU) = ~ u(cE;
 1(;cU)) and v(cU;) = ~ v(cU;
 1(;cU)): (19)








which implies (5). Now, note that
u(cE;(;cU);cU) = ~ u(cE;):
It follows that, for any given (cE;), the function s ! (;cU) satises the
following ordinary dierential equation:
u2(cE;(;cU);cU)s(;cU) + u3(cE;(;cU);cU) = 0: (20)
The income eect, that is the dependence of (;cU) on cU, is given by (20).
Conversely, consider two functions u(cE;;cU) and v(cU;) satisfying condi-
tions (4) and (5). Thanks to (5), the ordinary dierential equation (20) does not
depend on cE. For a given initial condition at some point x0, the solution of this
equation does not depend on cE. Using  to parameterize the initial condition,
say (;x0) = , we get a family of functions cU ! (;cU) that characterize the
behavior of the agent and the income eect. We dene

~ u(cE;) = u(cE;(;cU);cU)
~ v(cU;) = v(cU;(;cU)):
Thanks to (20), the denition of ~ u is consistent, that is ~ u does not depend on cU.
When the dimension of  is greater than 1, the condition (5) is not necessary
any more, as the following example shows. We x M > 1 and suppose that




~ u(cE;) =  
1
M + cE   1
~ v(cU;) =  
1
M + (1 + 2)cU
:
(21)
22The functions ~ u and ~ v are strictly increasing and strictly concave in income
for all  = (1;2). It is easy to check that (2) holds with (1;2;cU) =
1 + cU2 and that 1, conditionally on , is uniformly distributed.12 If we note







M + cR   1
R(!)   s1:





M + cE   
M + cE    + cU
which does not satisfy (5).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Pointwise maximization leads to the global maximum in the absence of pooling,
so that the only thing to prove is the no pooling property. It is a straightforward
consequence of single crossing. Under Assumption 1,
@2L
@R@!














The left hand side is nonnegative from pointwise maximization. The right hand
side is of the same sign as R(!0)   R(!).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2












j  R   s;!;s

(22)
decreases with R. To simplify notations, we drop the variables s and ! which are
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j  R   s

:





is smaller than 1. By concavity of the utility function, the rst term is negative.







is non positive. The result follows.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We rst prove the last statement of the Proposition. Since F is log-concave,
whenever pE(R) < , the last term in the expression of M in (16) is the product
of two positive nondecreasing functions. The function M therefore is increasing,
with a slope larger than 1.
We now show the rst part of the Proposition. If pE(R) is smaller than  for
all R such that R   s is in the support of , case 1 holds. Otherwise   pE(R)
for all R implies that !   R(!) + s  0, which in turn by feasibility (8) is only
possible if all the inequalities are equalities and s is equal to zero.
A.5 Example 1
















U(R   )   U(s)
R   s   
:
Integrating and substituting yields
M(R;s) = 2(R   s)     
U(R   )   U(s)

:
The function M(R;s) is strictly convex in R and M0
R(s + ;s) = 2   pU(s)=.
1) Case pU(s)  2. M(R;s) is strictly increasing in R and Proposition 3
applies. The convexity of M(:;s) implies the concavity of R(!).
2) Case pU(s) > 2. As in the proof of Proposition 3, we consider the pointwise
maximum of L(R;s;!) for R   s  . Since it is increasing in !, it satises the
monotonicity condition and is the optimum.
Recall that L(s + ;s;!) = 0. Now,
@L
@R




for   R   s   is a concave function of R which becomes negative for large
enough R. We consider three cases:
a. For ! > , @L=@R(s + ;!) is positive. There is a single zero R(!) of the
derivative, solution to ! = M(R;s), which maximizes L(R;s;!).
b. For ! = , @L=@R(s+;s;!) is equal to zero. @2L=@R2(;s;!) = (pU(s) 
1   )=(   ) is positive, so that there is another root R(), larger than
s+ (R = s+ is a local minimum of L). Recall that L(s+;s;!) is equal
to zero for all !: the maximum is positive.
c. Finally consider ! < . The function @L=@R(;s;!) is linear increasing in !:
when ! decreases from , its smallest root increases, its largest root (a local
maximum of L), say (!), decreases, until eventually they both disappear,
say at !1, !1 < . Note that L((!);s;!) is an increasing function of
!. Since L(;s;) = 0, L((!1);s;!1) is negative. Let !2, !2 > !1,
be such that L((!2);s;!2) is equal to zero. Dene !0 = max(!;!2),
R(!)   s = (!) for !0  !  , and R(!)   s =  for ! smaller than !0.
It is easy to check that the R(!) function thus dened indeed is the solution of
the problem.
25A.6 Proof of Lemma 2
Writing the eect of a translation of the overall income (increasing R(!) for all
! and s by the same small amount) shows that the expectation in w of
F(R(!)   sj!;s)pE(R(!);sj!) + [1   F(R(!)   sj!;s)]pU(R(!);sj!)
+

[!   R + s]
@F
@s




Consider rst points ! where R(:) is strictly increasing and the rst order
condition (11) holds. For these points, we set  = 1
f
@F
@s . Thanks to (6), we get:
  1. It follows from the rst order condition (11) that
[!   R + s]
@F
@s
(R(!)   sj!;s) = [!   R + s]f = F(   pE):
Now consider a pooling interval [!1;!2] where R is constant and equal to  R.



















!1 (!    R + s)@F
@s dG(!)
R !2




!1 (   pE)FdG(!) > 0, we get   1.
Suppose now that  R   s  !2. The same computation yields
Z !2
!1














Finally suppose that !1 <  R s < !2. Then, using (6) and the second pooling
condition (14), we get
Z !2
 R s










For ! 2 [  R   s;!2], we dene  as
 =
R !2
 R s(!    R + s)@F
@s dG(!)
R !2
 R s(   pE)FdG(!)














For ! 2 [!1;  R   s], we dene  as
 =
R  R s
!1 (!    R + s)@F
@s dG(!)
R  R s
!1 (   pE)FdG(!)
and get, again,   1. (Notice that
R  R s
!1 (   pE)FdG(!) < 0.)
Replacing in (23) the term [!   R + s]@F=@s (or its integral on pooling
intervals) by the expressions derived above yields the desired result.
Finally recall that absent income eects: @F=@s =  = 0, while when leisure
is a normal good, @F=@s is everywhere less than or equal to 0.
27